INTRODUCTION
Like it or not, Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are taking an increasingly active role in larger societal issues and debates.
Whether it's a social advocacy campaign that seeks to reduce violence and bullying, 2 a decision by a pharmacy company to stop selling tobacco products, 3 or a sportswear company's decisions to take a stand in solidarity with an advocate's resistance to police brutality, 4 TNCs are becoming increasingly vocal * Professor of Law, West Virginia University. This article was supported, in part, by a Hodges' Fund Faculty Research Grant. Many thanks to Wade Sockman and Emily Cramer for some much-needed assistance with research. Also, I am grateful for the support and insight of the following people: Valarie Blake, Amber Brugnoli, Rachel Chambers, Amy Cyphert, Kirsha Trychta, Elaine Wilson, and Tara Van Ho. regarding their role in larger societal issues. 5 But there is a darker side to the increased intermingling between corporations and the larger societal impact; namely the potential for a corporation to be involved, or sometimes, at the heart of, crimes against humanity. 6 As a result of the increased allegations levied against corporations for these types of violations, 7 having corporations criminally prosecuted is a top priority for many business and human rights' (BHR) advocates who wish to hold TNCs accountable. 8 The argument certainly engenders sympathy: in order for TNCs to reach the level of culpability to justify accountability under international criminal kaepernick-nike-contract-donation-know-your-rights/ [https://perma.cc/T8MK-PJP3].
5. To be clear, the discussion regarding what role corporations can and should have in society has been discussed and debated for quite some time. Indeed, at least as far back as the early 1970s with Milton Freidman's now famous article in the New York Times, the debate both for and (as Friedman's article suggests) against corporate social responsibility and its closely related cousin, business and human rights, has occurred in the popular discourse. However, it is only within the last decade or so that these issues have taken on such an explicit framework. . Specifically, the Introduction notes that "when corporate actors, including corporate entities or individuals acting on behalf of a corporate entity, commit or are complicit in the commission of crimes linked to human rights abuses, accountability all too rarely follows. Id. at i. law, some horrendous acts must have occurred. Whether in the area of exploitative labor practices, gross environmental impacts, or even complicity with genocide, victims of these crimes at the hands of TNCs have an understandable desire to want to see justice served.
But is using international criminal law to prosecute the TNC itself really the best course of action?
On the one hand, holding a corporation liable would align with the conceptual notion of the corporation as person -a concept that has been adopted in most contexts 9 and, as such, would satisfy those who wish to hold the TNC accountable. On the other hand, holding a TNC criminally liable under international law cannot be done without unpacking several layers at the intersection of corporate law, international human rights law, and criminal jurisprudence. 10 As such, the aim of this essay is not to solve all the issues that are implicated by TNCs being prosecuted criminally under international law. Rather, my objective is to highlight some of the more pernicious issues offered by the current state of affairs and offer my initial thoughts regarding whether we should proceed and, if so, what should be considered. Specifically, part one of this essay will discuss the challenges inherent in the dualistic nature of the TNCfrequently presenting itself as a unified organization, while at the same time strategically using its separate legal entities -and the enforcement implications that arise from that challenge. Part two will move on to the procedural challenges that arise from prosecuting a TNC (both domestically and internationally) before turning to part three, which will discuss the challenges under two areas of substantive law -namely corporate and criminal law. Taking all of the above into account, part four will then address whether, given all of these challenges, using international mechanisms to prosecute TNCs is, in fact, wise. To that end, part four will discuss some potential costs that could arise from a successful prosecution before examining some already established principles to see if they As recent trends in international law would suggest, 12 the cries of support for holding TNCs accountable for their role in human rights violations seems to be gaining traction. As such, it seems particularly timely -when the debate for the appropriate mechanism is still in its nascent stage 13 -to have a frank conversation regarding the challenges and underlying rationale for holding TNCs 11. One major caveat: because there is currently no mechanism to prosecute a corporate entity under international criminal law, this essay must by definition, be a thought exercise. The International Criminal Court (ICC) -the chief body for prosecuting criminal activity under an international framework -has no mechanism for attaching liability to a corporation and can, instead, only prosecute corporate executives for their role in criminal activity that falls within the ICC's jurisdiction. Rome Statute, supra note 5. society is pre-conditioned to attach liability 'in the court of public opinion' to the TNC, even if the specific corporate entity itself is not to blame. 21 In short, TNCs have been effective at blurring lines so that we think of them as a giant monolithic when, in fact, they are linked through wholly owned and partially owned subsidiaries or, (even more attenuated) through independent vendors within a supply chain. 22 The TNC's duality also informs the challenges prosecutors face, both procedurally and substantively, in holding these corporations criminally accountable. 23 
II. THE CHALLENGES IN PROCEDURAL LAW
Among the hosts of issues that arise in bringing particularly egregious TNC behavior to justice, the most pernicious one is regarding the process with which to do so. This idea of process raises a number of issues under international law: everything from the venue, to the political will needed, 24 to the jurisdictional power, to the seemingly more mundane (but equally compelling) issue for impacted communities, of logistics.
25 This essay will discuss only a small subset 23. There are numerous examples of criminal cases that have been brought against TNCs in jurisdictions outside of the United States. For instance, a recent study convened by the European Parliament, identified 35 cases of human rights abuses (both civil and criminal) allegedly perpetrated by corporations in the European Union alone. See DROI Report, supra note 10. While a full review of the cases analyzed in the study are outside the scope of this essay, the study's findings regarding twelve of the cases chosen for in-depth review demonstrate that, to date, none have resulted in a corporation being held liable for human rights abuses. Id. at 104 -106. In addition, many of the barriers to justice identified in the study are in line with the issues raised in this essay, including: "Access to evidence; costs of bringing claims; safety of witnesses; time barriers; culture and/or language barrier." Id. at 103.
24. The issue of political will can be tied both to foundational concerns a prosecutor might have but also the necessary decisions regarding how to prioritize prosecutions, given the limited resources available to law enforcement.
25. This, in turn, raises a host of subsidiary issues that include, how to call witnesses, in what language to conduct the trial, who speaks for the corporation and how you overcome the transportation barriers that are often insurmountable for witnesses. of those issues -namely examining the jurisdictions in which these proceedings should be held. 26 Specifically, the next sections will discuss both the use of U.S. domestic litigation to tackle extraterritorial behavior and the use (largely theoretical at this point) of international venues, in particular the International Criminal Court (the "ICC").
A. Domestic Courts Using Extraterritoriality Applications
On the domestic level, attempts to hold TNCs accountable (civilly and criminally) have been met with unfettered corporate resistance. For instance, in the United States, corporations have levied vigorous defenses against human rights advocates' attempts to use the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) as a vehicle to hold TNCs liable. 27 The strategy appears to have been, at least partially, effective. 28 In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court held foreign 29 corporations could not be brought within the ambit of the ATS. 30 While there is some movement in other jurisdictions 31 to provide victims of human rights abuses with the ability to hold 26. While, by its nature, raising the procedural issues also implicates the substantive issues (specifically regarding what law to apply), I will, for the sake of logical structure, leave those issues to the next section. 30. What's interesting about the ATS is that it marks the departure from the typical strategy of holding corporations liable for white collar crimes. Specifically, in order for corporations to fall within the ambit of the ATS there must first be a crime against humanity. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004). The irony, of course, is that a crime against humanity under international law only translates to a tort under U.S. jurisdiction (through the ATS) -there is no parallel criminal jurisdictional statute. This also highlights the fact that, under U.S. criminal law, most of the crimes that TNCs have been found to have violated have been white collar crimes instead of the more atrocious crimes against humanity.
31. Australia's Criminal Code expressly discusses the liability of corporate bodies and Indonesia has recently pursued criminal prosecution of TNCs in regards to environmental law violations. ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: [Vol. 29:219 corporations accountable, the significant limitation of the ATS has, practically speaking, curtailed extraterritorial civil litigation against corporate entities.
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One way to potentially circumvent the issues of extraterritoriality would be for prosecutors to find a nexus between the corporation's activities within its home state (usually the jurisdiction where the headquarters sits) and the activities of its subsidiaries within the host state. So, for instance, if a prosecutor could find a connection between the decisions of the parent corporation's board of directors and the specific actions of its subsidiary to effectuate that decision, then perhaps a link could be established that would establish jurisdiction for the parent corporation. Unfortunately, criminal prosecutions that have been built around attempting to find such a nexus have been met with limited success.
33
In addition, cross border claims against corporations raise a number of practical issues. For instance, according to one report developed by human rights advocates, the particular challenges for prosecuting corporate cross border crimes include the disparity between the ease with which corporations can operate and the limitations on state actors. 34 Specifically, the report notes that:
Multinational corporate entities act across borders with ease due to developments in technology as well as favourable corporate, trade and investment laws. In the United States, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence around issues of jurisdiction and TNCs would seem to suggest that criminal prosecutions for extraterritorial conduct would also be met with limited success. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___ , 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (holding that a plaintiff cannot establish jurisdiction over a parent company based upon the acts of its subsidiaries that took place outside of the country).
34. THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 9.
protect human rights and deter companies from committing wrongful acts have not kept pace with these developments. For example, the issues of separate legal personality and limited shareholder liability present significant legal challenges for accountability where the case involves a parent company based in a home State that operates through a local subsidiary or joint venture in the host State. This "governance gap" has created an environment in which corporate actors are able to commit serious human rights abuses and other corporate crimes with little accountability for doing so.
35
In the end, prosecutors are at once fully aware of the challenges of bringing a transnational case against multiple corporate entities 3 6 leading many, perhaps, to be fearful of the public's reaction if the challenges of prosecuting multiple entities proves to be insurmountable. 37 As such, under the current domestic framework, at least within the United States, exercising jurisdiction against TNCs for acts committed abroad seems problematic.
In theory, then, an international venue would overcome many of the issues raised by cross border investigations. However, it would also raise several other concerns.
B. International Venues
Currently, there are a limited number of venues that could tackle the issue of holding TNCs liable for international criminal law violations. 38 Chief among them 35. Id. This issue is exacerbated when the corporation may not be directly involved in the specific legal issue, but rather the criminal behavior is done by an actor within its supply chain. See Martin, supra note 18.
36. THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, Principle Five, Commentary (stating that investigators and prosecutors "recognised that obtaining evidence and assistance in cross-border corporate crimes cases can be especially challenging.") 37. To wit, it would seem a perfectly reasonable concern of prosecutors that their failure to overcome the jurisdictional and personality hurdles posed by the TNC (see infra for details) could lead to public approbation that TNCs were getting off on a technicality. Cf. Hot Coffee (2011) (the documentary that explores the public perception of a litigant who won a multi-million suit against McDonald's for burns she sustained after spilling McDonalds' coffee on herself. As the filmmakers show, the public's perception of the plaintiff (including one person who alludes to "jackpot justice") is at odds with the factual evidence that was shown (i.e., that she sustained third degree burns near her genitalia and was in danger of losing her life would be the ICC. 39 The types of crimes within the ambit of BHR advocate portfolios, including trafficking and forced labor, could theoretically fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. In fact, these types of violations fall squarely within the ICC's mission which, it states, is to: "help put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes." 40 In addition, the ICC is a fairly unusual creature of international law; although it followed the rules of treaty ratification (i.e., with states agreeing to be bound) it has jurisdiction over individuals instead of state parties. 41 As such, individual actors can be prosecuted if their state is a party to the convening statute. Although prosecutions that proceed under the ICC's authority involve crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, 42 the ICC has jurisdictional power over any individual who is complicit in these acts, including corporate executives. 43 Despite these advantages, the ICC remains a problematic option. Foremost, the foundational statute does not allow the prosecution of corporations. 44 In order to overcome such a limitation then, all convening state parties would have to agree to amend the treaty, an arduous process under the best of circumstances but one that seems particularly problematic in the current environment. 41. In that sense, it differs from the other treaties which are primarily mechanisms for holding States (or countries) as duty bearers accountable under international law.
42. A person convicted in the ICC is subject to either (1) imprisonment for a specified number of years, not to exceed 30 or (2) a term of life imprisonment, when justified. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 77(1). Convicted persons are also subject to additional penalties which may include (1) a fine or (2) a forfeiture of property derived directly or indirectly from the crime of which he was convicted. Id. at art. 77(2). At the conclusion of trial resulting in a guilty verdict, the convicted person serves their prison sentence in a member-state designated by the Court which have indicated their willingness to accept convicted persons. Id. at art. 103(1)(a). The report goes on to note that the leverage that corporations have over regulatory actors, even states themselves, are such that corporate influence almost certainly plays a role in the political will (or lack thereof) for a prosecutor to bring an action against a TNC or a state to amend a treaty to provide for more robust prosecutions of TNCs. Indeed, the report goes on to note that corporate lobbying is a significant method used to influence state actors at both the national and international level. 47. Id. at 852. Specifically, Vest notes that the banality of corporate activity can still be liable under international criminal law -if it in some way helps to promote the committing of atrocities. As Vest writes: "in theory, no business activity, regardless of how ordinary or 'neutral' it seems to be, can explicitly be left outside the scope of, e.g. accessorial liability to the commission of an international crime. Scenarios may cover providing raw materials, any kind of semi-finished products, end-products such as, e.g. weapons, goods and services including personal, technical and logistical assistance, information, cash, credit and banking facilities." Id. at 852. However, the nature of these activities also makes it more difficult to collect evidence and investigate. 49. See Bernaz, supra note 13, at 2-3 (noting that the new policy paper has attracted a range of responses from the business and human rights field, ranging from the positive (a potential "tool to achieve justice for victims") to the dismissive (viewing the paper "as mere talk unlikely to lead to any real change."). In other venues, however, there does seem to be more movement towards [Vol. 29:219 Theoretically, then, while the ICC seems to be a compelling venue for the prosecutions of corporate related crimes against humanity, it seems as if the current political will renders this an unlikely alternative. In addition, even if the political will were found amongst the relevant decision makers, the implementation of such a program would lead to a host of logistical issues that would protract an already extenuated process.
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In addition, as the next section demonstrates, given the hurdles that have arisen in the U.S. when corporate and criminal law have intersected, trying to undergo corporate prosecutions under international law, where many of these issues can be magnified, 51 could lead to a similar exacerbation in the challenges present.
III. THE CHALLENGES IN SUBSTANTIVE LAW
The hurdles that abound in applying the substantive law to TNCs are daunting. The issues take place in two primary areas of jurisprudence -corporate and criminal law.
A. Corporate Law
There are two seemingly incompatible trends taking place in U.S. corporate law today -increasingly providing corporations with rights, including using international human rights law to hold TNCs accountable for abuses. For instance, in 2018, the UN Human Rights Council issued a zero-draft treaty on business and human rights. The purpose of the treaty is to "strengthen the respect, promotion, protection and fulfilment of human rights in the context of business activities of transnational character;" LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENT TO REGULATE, IN 50. For instance, any cross-border investigation would, presumably, need the cooperation of both the host state (where the violations occurred) and the home state (where the TNC's headquarters are located). As such, any difficulties that normally arise with inter-agency cooperation would only be magnified when each agency works under a different, sovereign, nation.
51. WVU Law, supra note 21. 52. Another specific issue that, while outside the scope of this essay is nonetheless worth mentioning, is the significant issue of trying to develop a cohesive jurisprudential model for corporate criminal liability when there are so many distinct legal doctrines (i.e., common law, civil law, Sharia law) that would need to be addressed. constitutional rights, while limiting accountability for the entity as a whole. 53 Both of these trends seem to arise from imbuing corporations with legal personality. As a result, while the corporate structure is in essence, a legal fiction, these legal fictions have nonetheless been given certain rights under U.S. law. 54 For instance, a corporation can sue and be sued in its own name. 55 It can also own property, hold accounts in its own name and legally undertake many of the same actions of an individual human being. 56 In addition, the corporation has grown exponentially in the last century. 57 While originally it was designed as a way of pooling resources and acting within a very limited corporate charter given by the state, it has now become a ubiquitous business structure. 58 This evolution has also resulted in the TNC.
Despite being imbued with legal personality, TNCs are nonetheless difficult to hold accountable. By definition, a TNC is a multinational enterprise, with subsidiaries that cross jurisdictional boundaries. 59 Specifically, a TNC arises when a corporation creates a wholly-owned but legally separate entity (or several legal entities) known as subsidiaries.
60
The purpose of the subsidiary can be varied, but often it is created specifically to further shield the parent company from liability. 61 Under this structure, the original corporation becomes known as 61. The general rule of corporate law is that parent companies are not liable for the actions of their subsidiaries. However, there is an exception -when a court finds evidence to warrant piercing the corporate veil (or establishing enterprise liability). These instances mainly occur when the parent company to the subsidiary corporation.
62 This is further complicated when these subsidiary corporations all operate outside the U.S., mostly in developing countries where the regulatory system is much weaker than in the home country. 63 This situation becomes even more complex when these subsidiaries have their own subsidiaries and their ownership is spread across multiple shareholders that include other corporations or state-owned enterprises. In short, each of these subsidiaries are corporations with separate legal personalities and limited liability. And yet, rarely do prosecutors have the ability or desire to bring to justice each of the separate legal personalities that may be involved in a corporate conspiracy sufficient enough to trigger crimes against humanity.
64
The duality inherent in corporate structures and their specific actors is further complicated by the numerous legal frameworks in which a corporation operates. For instance, using the corporate structure to commit illegal acts implicates the corporate law of the particular state in which the corporation in incorporated. If the corporation is publicly traded, then U.S. securities law violations may also be present. If that publicly traded corporation is, for instance, involved in bribing government officials in order to achieve their ends, then anti-corruption laws might also be implicated. All of that may occur in a single national framework. As noted earlier, these challenges are multiplied when there are different state actors involved.
In addition, the internal corporate structure and its purported purpose leads to a number of competing interests that can give rise to reckless behavior. The seminal case of Dodge v. Ford forms the basis for the enduring concept regarding the purpose of the corporation in the U.S. 65 To wit, the corporation is viewed as a vehicle "organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders."
66
This narrative underlies much of the jurisprudence that has been written over the years and also forms the basis of many of the key legal principles in U.S. corporate case law. The shareholder profit narrative also results in an inherent tension in the structure and purpose of a corporation. If a corporation can only act through its corporate officers, and the corporate officers are largely shielded from liability for its decisions, then there is a danger that corporate officers will make decisions largely for their own self-interest rather than for the best interest of the corporation's shareholders. Taken to an extreme, this could result in corporate officers acting recklessly and using the corporation as a vehicle to commit the entities are operating as a single business enterprise, the subsidiary has no assets of its' own, or there is a fraudulent transfer of assets in an effort to avoid liability. At a minimum, there are an overwhelming amount of choices that corporate executives need to examine when facing questionable business practices. As a result, it may often be tempting to make an unprincipled decision in haste. 68 When those consequences lead to criminal activity, the challenge for law enforcement becomes that much more difficult: with agencies having to assess many of the same actions and decisions that a corporate officer must engage in after the fact, but now with an eye towards gathering evidence for prosecution. There is also an additional hurdle of having less embedded cooperation across agencies (since, despite the corporate legal constructs, managers will often have greater access to information within a corporation's subsidiaries and affiliates than outside investigators) and it is clear that law enforcement faces a herculean task in assessing criminal activity that takes place in multiple jurisdictions with multiple legal entities in play.
69
There are also other stakeholders that can affect a corporation's structure and its governance framework. They may include: employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and the communities where the corporation operates. 70 While none of these stakeholders typically have formal representation within corporate law jurisprudence (i.e., corporate officers and directors are generally not required to put the interests of these stakeholders above the needs of shareholder profitability), 71 
72 However, where a corporation operates in a "weak governance zone" in which these stakeholders have only limited leverage, then the needs of these stakeholders (such as employees or vendors of the corporation) will take a backseat to the purpose of the corporation. 73 In addition, while not all of the stakeholders listed above will have a direct impact on the legal liability of the corporation, they do have the ability to wield power and influence at the corporation. However, in assessing how likely a corporation or its stakeholders will be to cooperate in a criminal investigation, the purpose of the corporation and how it affects decisions within the corporate structure should not be ignored.
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B. Criminal Law
Contrary to popular belief, 75 there have been a surprising number of corporations that have been indicted in the United States. 76 Most of these prosecutions have led to settlements and, despite the narrative that arose in the wake of Arthur Andersen's indictment and subsequent demise, very few (if any) have resulted in the liquidation of the corporation. As such, there is some benefit to analyzing the issues and challenges that arise when attempting to prosecute a corporation for a crime.
Although the particular elements of a crime might differ, the heart of every crime has two facets: (1) the actus reus (the behavior or specific criminal action) and (2) the mens rea (the intent, or state of mind that accompanied those acts or actions). Each of these are exceedingly more complicated when the "person" committing the crime is a legal fiction. How does one assess that for a corporation? In the United States, the law has done so with the use of the respondeat superior doctrine. 77 This concept allows courts to hold one person liable for the acts of its agents so long as the agents were: (1) acting within their scope of employment and (2) acting for the master's benefit. 78 Once you have established, for instance, that a corporate executive intentionally used forced labor in the manufacture of basketball shoes, then you can use that theory to hold the master -in this case the corporation -liable for the executive's acts.
Many courts have wrestled with the scope of employment doctrine. As one commentator has noted, " [d] etermining exactly what constitutes conduct 'within the scope of employment' is a difficult task and the subject of numerous judicially developed rules and guidelines." 79 The factors that a court will consider to determine whether an employee was acting within the scope of her employment include: the employee's intent when performing the act; the nature, specific time, and place where the act occurred (i.e., whether at a relevant location or far away from the site); whether the act relates to the type of work that the employee was hired to do; whether the act was a reasonable outgrowth of the work that the employee was hired to do; and whether the employee in general had a reasonable amount of freedom in executing the acts. 80 Courts will also consider whether the conduct was done with some particular type of intent-whether for the benefit of the corporation, whether done with specific malice, whether the corporation (through its agents) were reckless in the behavior and that recklessness led to injury.
81
There are several issues that complicate a corporate criminal case. Similar to other criminal investigations, when investigating allegations of corporate misconduct, it is rare to find direct evidence that points to one culpable executive who committed the criminal act. 82 Rather, it is frequently several executives who are often working in tandem (or sometimes at cross-purposes) and whose conduct, as a whole, would fulfill the elements at issue but when examined compartmentally, may not. In short, while there may be several pieces of evidence that show several different executives were somewhat involved in a part of the act, there is often no one master puppeteer that put it all together. 83 This was exactly what the defense argued in the Arthur Andersen case. On March 7, 2002, a federal grand jury indicted the U.S. accounting firm on one count of obstruction of justice. 84 The firm was the auditor for then-energy giant Enron. 85 During trial, Andersen's attorneys employed an explicit "Where's Waldo?" defense, arguing that the prosecution could not show that there was any one individual who was responsible for the acts alleged. While the defense's strategy was ineffective at trial, it did form a basis for the Supreme Court's reversal of the conviction in May 2005, 86 although not before Arthur Andersen declared bankruptcy.
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In response to the difficulty of using respondeat superior for corporate criminal law, commentators have set forth alternate theories for holding corporations criminally liable. Here, I consider two models: the patchwork verdict model and the corporate ethos model, to see if they can be applied to any proposed international criminal law framework.
88
For instance, Stacey Neumann Vu, argues for what she calls a patchwork verdict. Under this theory, a jury could find liability in situations where it knows that something illegal has occurred but doesn't know which particular agent is responsible for the act in question sufficient enough to bring about respondeat superior liability. 89 Vu also makes the point that, in large organizations (such as 88. Although outside the scope of this essay, there are other theories that have been implemented in other jurisdictions as a way of extending criminal liability to corporations. For instance, in Australia, the legislature has passed provisions in their Criminal Code that extend criminal liability to corporations. See Chambers & Batesmith, supra note 45. Commentators also note that that "Australia has a somewhat progressive approach to the attribution of criminal responsibility through the notion of corporate culture." Id. at 20. In providing their own recommendations regarding ways to expand UK law to allow for corporate criminal liability for actions committed overseas, the authors also noted that one possible tact, under UK law, would be to extend (or shift the guidance in UK's Bribery Act) to allow for UK corporations to be criminally prosecuted if senior management in the corporation's UK office evidenced a failure in management that led to human rights abuses. All of these factors focus on determining the corporation's ethos that contributed to the violation. 94 As such, it is important when circumstantially determining a corporation's liability that the agent or actor was shown to have been encouraged by the corporation's ethos which then played a role in manipulating their actions.
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While each of these models are a step forward from the current respondeat superior model, they also have similar limitations. Each model would seemingly require a more intensive evidence gathering strategy to make connections across various entities and subsidiaries. Moreover, as I suggest in the next section, even if these models were employed; under international criminal law, the consequences in their successful deployment might lead to larger societal challenges. (1) whether the corporate management is aware of the illegal activities of their lower-level employees; (2) whether the activities of the employees were routine and embedded into the corporation; (3) whether the employees were acting under direct instructions from supervisors. Prosecutors could also consider expert testimony that would show the "time and expense" of being within the law compared to the actual acts of the corporation. See THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 7.
94. Id. at 1128. 95. Id.
IV. SHOULD A TNC BE HELD LIABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW?
In contrast to the voluminous discussions by scholars regarding the potential impediments to the prosecution of a TNC, there has been relatively discussion regarding the negative consequences of their successful prosecution. Of those that have discussed this issue, one of the most enduring narratives that persists is that the prosecution of TNCs may in fact lead to their death. 96 While, on the national level, at least one scholar, Gabriel Markoff, has shown that this is predominantly a false narrative (in fact U.S. corporations that are criminally prosecuted usually survive) 97 and, as such, adds an important element to the debate on corporate criminal convictions, it appears that, in the end, it may be inapplicable to the specific issue regarding prosecuting TNCs under international criminal law. The convictions that Markoff analyzed were almost exclusively based on financial crimes. 98 Given the egregiousness of the types of crimes at issue (in that they are primarily crimes against humanity), one wonders if the public outcry if a corporation were to be convicted of these issues would be more significant and lead to stronger collateral consequences.
However, Markoff's study does implicate a facet of criminal law that is at the heart of holding corporations accountable. Specifically, how do you punish the corporation? You can't send it to jail. 99 You can certainly condemn it to die 100 by erasing its corporate charter and dissolving it. 101 But then what impact will that have on surrounding communities? Like it or not, corporations, particularly TNCs, are incredibly powerful entities.
1 0 2 As a result, liquidating the whole TNC structure, even if it were feasible, would likely lead to debilitating effects on all those affected by it. 103 Dead corporations can hurt shareholders, communities, employees and millions of other stakeholders. 104 Also, would we just dissolve the parent corporation? The offending subsidiary? If so, where would that leave the rest of the corporate organ? The irony, of course, is that if a corporation is facing international criminal liability, then it will have probably had to have been accused of involvement with atrocities. 105 106. There is a mechanism that the SEC has for stopping truly bad corporate behavior. It is delisting a corporation -in essence taking away their access to the markets for capital. However, during my almost five years at the SEC the Commission rarely took this action against a corporation for its bad acts. Why? Because we recognized that doing so would, cripple (if not debilitate) the corporation, theoretically impacting thousands of investors.
107. But BHR advocates may not be happy anyway. Infra, part four B. Unfortunately, there is some indication that the use of fines to punish corporations seems to have failed in its deterrent effect.
110 Prof. W. Robert Thomas takes a different approach to examining corporate criminal liability. Thomas argues that, instead of looking at corporate punishment primarily through the lens of criminal law, an examination of corporate jurisprudence is integral to our understanding of the issues that come into play when doling out features of corporate punishment under criminal law.
111 According to Thomas, this stems from the fundamentally "diametrically opposed conceptions of what the corporation is."
112 On the one hand, criminal law treats the corporation as a single person. On the other hand, corporate law treats the corporation as "systems of designs" that can be tinkered with and used as needed. 113 According to Thomas,
The fine, after all, is the paradigmatic form of corporate punishment; it is the first, and for decades the only, method by which the criminal law could hold a corporation criminally responsible for its misconduct. Today, it continues to be the most prevalent method of punishing corporations: nearly 90% of organizations convicted between 1999 and 2012 received some form of financial sanction. Moreover, at least at first glance, there is much to recommend about corporate-criminal fines.
Comparatively speaking, fines are easy to administer; easy to scale in response to the size of the corporation, the severity of the crime, and a host of other factors; easy to predict in their consequences to third parties (including their social benefits); and easy to see as fitting punishmentwhat better way to punish an entity designed largely to create wealth than to seize from it its wealth? 114 Nonetheless, Prof. Thomas argues that criminal fines are structurally incapable of satisfying the "standard goals of punishment."
115 Thomas also mentions a number of other interventions that have been taken more recently to punish corporations -namely, dissolution, corporate probation, regulatory intervention, and suspension. 1 1 6 However, the structural issues persist. If TNCs cannot be held liable under international law then it must still rely on the domestic legal system. As such, any solution that is designed to hold TNCs accountable would have to work within that reality. To that end, there seems to be some acknowledgment that a holistic approach would be the best way to hold corporations accountable for egregious criminal behavior. For instance, in 2016, Amnesty International and the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable published a report proposing a multifaceted strategy for addressing the impunity gap between egregious corporate criminal behavior and the means to combat the criminal activity; the report (entitled The Corporate Crimes Principles or the Principles) is based on ten principles that the organizations urge governments' to use when pursuing, investigating and prosecuting corporate crimes. 117 The Principles are comprehensive: they provide a fulsome discussion on the many issues and challenges that are faced in bringing egregious corporate behavior to justice, while taking steps to discuss solutions. One key facet of the Principles is its insistence that remedies for the victim be a part of the overall strategy employed by prosecutors.
118 Therefore, it offers a robust program that is based on the reality that we currently live in -namely that there is no specific mechanism for holding TNCs liable under international law.
119
As such, the Principles provide a robust counter point to consider in examining what mechanisms can be used to prosecute TNCs under international criminal law; lending itself in support of the notion that TNCs should be held liable for egregious acts.
B. . . . or Maybe Not
Legend has it that, in 281 BC, King Pyrrhus of Epirus battled an advancing Roman army to ward off invasion and domination by the Romans against the Greeks.
120 In the first two battles Pyrrhus and his army were victorious but the resulting toll taken on his troops was so heavy that Pyrrhus eventually lost the 117. THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 1, 9, 19, 28, 34, 42, 47, 53, 58, 64. Specifically, the ten principles are: (1) Fight impunity for corporate crimes by investigating and prosecuting offences; (2) Fight impunity for cross-border corporate crimes by choosing to assert jurisdiction; (3) Guarantee accountability and transparency in the justice process when pursuing corporate crimes; (4) Identify the legal standards and secure the evidence needed to establish liability for corporate crimes in your jurisdiction; (5) Collaborate widely to ensure accountability for corporate crimes, particularly in cross-border cases; (6) Pursue charges that reflect the gravity of the corporate crimes committed; (7) Investigate and prosecute those corporate actors most responsible for the wrongdoing; (8) Use all available legal tools to collect evidence, build cases and obtain the cooperation of critical witnesses in corporate crimes cases; (9) Ensure that victims of corporate crimes are able to obtain effective remedies; and (10) Put in place appropriate measures and incentives to protect victims, informants, whistle-blowers, witnesses and experts in corporate crimes cases. get upset because the company is doing very bad things. On the other hand, there are a significant number of people who would oppose the actions of the advocates because the corporation is bringing in jobs. This is at the heart of the fear of punishing corporations -because in the end they are legal fictions, they are not individuals and yet it's the flesh and blood employees and impacted communities that are often harmed. As a result, sometimes you can find yourself as an advocate getting everything you want and still losing. Why? Because the metaperson that is the TNC picks up and moves to another location.
CONCLUSION
As noted previously, TNCs are not in fact one single monolithic, but rather a series of subsidiaries and other legal entities that are organized under the laws of many different jurisdictions. The idea of examining the "IT" that makes up the TNC narrative then grows difficult you realize that the IT is really a series of its. On a basic, practical level this makes investigating the corporation a timeconsuming and expensive affair. This is multiplied further when one considers that each of these subsidiaries is located in a different jurisdiction with a different set of procedural rules and legal precedents (not to mention limitations on interjurisdictional cooperation).
As such, using the Principles to move towards greater TNC accountability may be the best approach. It allows prosecutors to work within the system that they have without taking the drastic step of trying to bring a TNC to justice 128 under international law. It also allows investigators to work within the current state-centered model. 129 However, we must acknowledge the cost. Specifically, our current system allows for TNCs to pick up and go anywhere it wants if it is unhappy with the outcome (something that may be less likely to happen when the TNC is prosecuted in an international venue). As such, it may be that the best solution would be better comity within the various state parties to achieve justice for these people while still allowing corporations to provide much needed development. Otherwise, a Pyrrhic victory will ensue.
